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EVOLUTION, PHENOTYPIC SELECTION,
AND THE UNITS OF SELECTION*

TIMOTHY SHANAHANt
Department of Philosophy

Loyola Marymount University

In recent years philosophers have attempted to clarify the units of selection
controversy in evolutionary biology by offering conceptual analyses of the term

'unit of selection'. A common feature of many of these analyses is an emphasis
on the claim that units of selection are entities exhibiting heritable variation in
fitness. In this paper I argue that the demand that units of selection be characterized in terms of heritability is unnecessary, as well as undesirable, on historical, theoretical, and philosophical grounds. I propose a positive account of
the proper referent of the term 'unit of selection', distinguishing between the
processes of evolution and phenotypic selection. The main result of this analysis
is greater clarity about the conceptual structure of evolutionary theory.

1. Introduction. That evolution can proceed in the absence of natural

selection is now a commonplace. Evolution can result from such nonselective processes as drift, mutation, inbreeding, and so forth. That natural selection can proceed in the absence of evolution has more recently

become widely appreciated. Stabilizing selection, for example, is a process in which deviants from an optimal value of a character are selected
against, thus maintaining gene frequencies at equilibrium in a population.
As John Endler puts it, "Natural selection is a process that results from

biological differences among individuals, and which may give rise to cu-

mulative genetic change or evolution, but does not guarantee it" (Endler
1986, p. 26). Evolution and natural selection are therefore understood to
be contingently related processes. It is the conjunction of the two pro-

cesses-evolution by natural selection which is held to account for much
of the diversity we encounter in the living world. Carefully distinguishing
between the two closely related processes has contributed to improve-

ments in the articulation of evolutionary theory, and consequently to a
clearer understanding of the causes of biological phenomena.
The distinction between evolution and natural selection is an important
one, but it does not go quite far enough. Natural selection itself is a

complex process which can be resolved into its constituent subprocesses.
*Received December 1987; revised May 1988.
tI would like to thank Edward Manier and two anonymous referees of this journal for
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
Philosophy of Science, 57 (1990) pp. 210-225.
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Doing so is essential for the identification of units of selection. In this
paper I argue that units of selection should be identified with those entities
that causally contribute to the subprocess of phenotypic selection, regardless of whether such entities also causally contribute to the distinct
processes of evolution and natural selection. A consequence of this view
is that units of selection need not be characterized in terms of heritable
variation in fitness. Adopting a distinction made recently by Maynard
Smith, I distinguish between units of selection and units of evolution. I
then show how this distinction throws light on historical, theoretical, and
philosophical aspects of the units of selection controversy.

2. Heritability. For a set of biological entities to evolve by natural se-

lection there must be biological differences among the entities that affect
their ability to survive and/or reproduce. Variance in fitness is thus a
necessary condition for evolution by natural selection. But it is not a sufficient condition. There must also be a correlation between the properties
of parents and offspring, so that the results of selection in one generation

are passed on to the next generation. There must be heritability. In terms
of geneticist Richard Lewontin's influential analysis, "The generality of

the principles of natural selection means that any entities in nature that
have variation, reproduction, and heredity may evolve" (Lewontin 1970,
p. 1).

Several authors (for example, Wimsatt 1980, 1981; Lloyd 1986) writing on the units of selection controversy have argued that Lewontin's
criteria for entities in nature to evolve also isolate requirements for an

entity to be a unit of selection. Thus Wimsatt: "These principles give
necessary conditions for an entity to act as a unit of selection". He goes
on to say, "The three conditions must all be met by the same entity, in
a way that can be summarized by saying that entities of that kind must
show heritable variance in fitness" (Wimsatt 1980; reprinted in Brandon

and Burian 1984, p. 102). These conditions, however, fail to be sufficient

for an entity to be a unit of selection. Any entity displaying heritable
variance in fitness is either a unit of selection or is composed out of units
of selection. In particular, Wimsatt argues, the entities which are to be

identified as units of selection must exhibit heritable context-independent
variance in fitness among entities at that level which does not appear as
heritable context-independent variance in fitness at some lower level

(Wimsatt 1981, p. 144).
Context-independence is important, we are told, because only the context-independent variance in fitness is heritable. Variance in fitness which
is context-dependent is destroyed when the context changes, and thus

cannot be passed on to offspring. For example, phenotypic variance in
fitness which is due to environmental factors is not passed on to offspring,
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although such offspring may exhibit it if the environment is the same as
that occupied by their parents (Falconer 1981). Likewise, phenotypic

variance due to genotype-environment interaction, or due to epistatic interactions among genes, is not heritable in the strongest sense, because
such variance exists in virtue of contextual factors which may well change
from parents to offspring. 'Heritability', in the sense in which population
biologists use the term, denotes the contribution that additive genetic variance contributes to the total phenotypic variance. Phenotypic variance in

a particular trait is said to be additive when it is due simply to the summed
effects of each of a number of individual alleles taken separately. Heritability, and hence additive genetic variance, are closely related to the
rate of evolution. R. A. Fisher's Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection states (roughly) that the rate of evolution is proportional to the
additive genetic variance of the population (Fisher 1930). More precisely,
the rate at which a trait is evolving in a population increases as the product
of its heritability and the intensity of the selection forces. When a term
representing heritability is combined with a term representing a selection

coefficient, the resulting model determines the rate of evolution-a very
interesting and important result, and one which provides the foundation
for Wimsatt's account (Wimsatt 1981, p. 144).

I wish to claim that although heritability (in either the narrow population genetics sense or in some broader sense) is essential for evolution

by natural selection, and, indeed, for natural selection without evolution,
it is nonetheless not a requirement for identifying an entity as a unit of

selection. To show this I will sketch an abstract hypothetical example in
which selection occurs in virtue of nonheritable variation in fitness among
organisms. This abstract example will be filled out with concrete biological detail in a later section. The example presented here is intended to

fix ideas without immersing us in questions of empirical accuracy.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that we have a population of or-

ganisms randomly distributed in a patchy environment, among which there
is significant phenotypic variance in some component of fitness. In gen-

eral, such phenotypic variance might be due to underlying genetic factors,
due to environmental factors, or, most commonly, it would be a product
of an interaction between genetic and environmental factors (Futuyma
1986, pp. 195-200). The phenotypic variance in the component of fitness
in the present case is interesting because it is due entirely to the environment. That is, the genetic contribution to the variance in this com-

ponent of fitness is 0.0, and the environmental contribution to the vari-

ance in this component of fitness is 1.0. The population of organisms is
then subjected to a selection regime, with the result that a higher proportion of those organisms possessing the component of fitness in ques-
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tion survives than of those lacking it. These survivors then go on to mate
and produce offspring.
In the case I've just described there would be phenotypic variation in

fitness among the individuals in the population of organisms as well as
a selective force acting on these organisms. As a consequence, there would

be differential mortality among the organisms in virtue of biological properties they possess (or lack), and the frequency of traits in the population
would change as a result. But, given the absence of a genetic basis for
the variation in the biological property in question, there might well be
no corresponding change in gene frequencies nor change in frequency of

traits in the population from one generation to the next. There would be
no natural selection, because there would be no invariable correlation
between the traits that aided the survival of the parents and those that are
represented in the offspring. On this scenario we have differential survival

(and mortality) of organisms in virtue of the survival value of their biological properties, but, due to the absence of heritability for these properties, no natural selection. Still, I would claim that the entities involved
in the process described above are selected for in virtue of biological
properties they exhibit, and thus function as units of selection in that
process. I conclude that heritability is not a necessary feature of a unit
of selection.

It might be objected that the case I've described is an example of the
operation of chance in biological phenomena, not a case of selection in

any sense, the reason being precisely that there is no invariable correlation between traits that aided the survival of the parents and those represented in the offspring. This objection misses the point in at least two
ways. First, the example does not stipulate that the cause of the differ-

ential mortality be some unusual event, such as a flood or an earthquake,

which wipes out organisms regardless of their biological properties. The
selecting agent can be as frequent as one likes, sifting the population

many times each generation until either no organisms remain, or else until
it ceases to be efficacious because the only organisms left are ones un-

affected by this selective agent. Second, the very fact that differential
mortality is a function of differential exemplification of a biological property precludes this from being an instance of chance. Chance (for ex-

ample, random genetic drift) is a nondiscriminating sampling process,
whereas selection is a preeminently discriminating sampling process (Beatty
1984; Shanahan 1989). It would be strange to call a process which sys-

tematically eliminates individuals not bearing a certain property, but spares

those displaying it, a chance process. This is especially so when the two
kinds of individuals are randomly distributed, as in the hypothetical population. I conclude that selection can operate on nonheritable properties
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of biological entities. Heritability and selection are distinct.
3. Phenotypic Selection. The biological motivation for making the distinction between heritability and selection comes from the need to separate distinct subprocesses constituting the two-step process of natural

selection in order to determine what empirical role each subprocess plays,
either individually or in conjunction with others, in producing biological

phenomena. Endler (1986), following the practice of quantitative geneticists and animal breeders (Fisher 1930; Haldane 1954; Falconer 1981;

Lande and Arnold 1983), divides the process of natural selection into the
sequential subprocesses of "phenotypic selection" and "genetic re-

sponse". 'Phenotypic selection is the within-generation change in the trait
distribution among cohorts . . . and is independent of any genetic system
or genetic determination" (Endler 1986, pp. 12-13). The genetic response is the genetic change which results from phenotypic selection in
combination with the genetic system. This latter subprocess involves the
transmission of the results of phenotypic selection to the succeeding gen-

eration, and requires that such results be heritable. Both phenotypic selection and genetic response are necessary for natural selection; neither
is sufficient by itself. "Phenotypic selection determines the distribution
of traits during reproduction, but inheritance is required to transform the
distribution into the next generation" (Endler 1986, p. 13).
Although natural selection requires both subprocesses, the actual se-

lection involved takes place in the first subprocess-during phenotypic
selection. For this reason natural selection is sometimes identified with
phenotypic selection (for example, Lande and Arnold 1983). It is during

this subprocess that entities interact with the environment and, in virtue
of possessing certain biological properties, change the frequency of traits
in the ensemble of entities. The genetic response subprocess, as described

by Endler, is an essentially nonselective process which transmits the results of phenotypic selection to the next generation. Both processes are
necessary for the evolution of adaptations, and thus entities which undergo

the sequential subprocesses of phenotypic selection and genetic response
are in a position to display adaptations. But entities which undergo phenotypic selection but do not have a corresponding genetic response, pre-

cisely in virtue of undergoing phenotypic selection, function as units of
selection in an important biological sense.

4. Units of Selection and Units of Evolution. This claim, of course,

rests on a novel definition of the term "unit of selection", one which, to
the best of my knowledge, is first made explicit by John Maynard Smith
(1987). He distinguishes between "units of selection" and "units of evolution". When we ask what are the biological entities that are selected
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for or against, we are asking about the units of selection. That is, units
of selection are entities which, in virtue of biological properties they display, interact with the environment in a way that causes their survival

and/or reproduction to be differential. The concept of a "unit of evolution" is more complex. "To qualify as a unit of evolution, it is not sufficient that an entity be selected for or against; it must have heredity"
(Maynard Smith 1987, p. 121). More precisely, in order to be a unit of

evolution, a biological entity must display the properties of multiplication, heredity, and variation. Such entities are important because, Maynard Smith argues, given these properties, they may evolve adaptations.

Maynard Smith's distinction between two kinds of units important in
evolutionary theory is an extremely useful one. As he says, "[I]t is important to distinguish between the objects we can expect to evolve adaptations and those we cannot" (Maynard Smith 1987, p. 122). Because

the primary motivation for distinguishing units of selection from units of
evolution is that the latter are the entities that display adaptations, whereas
the former do not necessarily do so, a more appropriate term might be
"units of adaptation". However, because Maynard Smith has used the
term "units of evolution" in print, and because it does capture an important concept, I will continue to use his term in this paper. Units of

selection, then, are entities which, in virtue of biological properties they
display, interact with the environment in a way that causes their survival

and/or reproduction to be differential. Units of evolution are entities which,
in virtue of displaying heritable variation in fitness, may evolve adaptations.

I am well aware that this distinction as I have described it still leaves

unresolved the question of which biological entities are instances of each
type of unit. Determining the correct answer to this question requires

consideration of conceptual and empirical issues beyond the scope of this
paper. My aim here is the more general one of delineating the kinds of

entities that need to be distinguished before clarity can be achieved with
respect to the identification of specific instances of units of selection (and

evolution). With this aim in mind, I turn next to applications of this distinction.

5. Historical Applications. Adoption of the distinction between units of

selection and units of evolution helps to clarify historical, theoretical, and
philosophical aspects of the units of selection controversy. I discuss each
of these aspects in turn, beginning with the historical.
Although disagreements about the units of selection can claim an an-

cestry going back to the corespondence between Charles Darwin and Alfred
Russel Wallace (see Kottler 1985 for details), the units of selection con-

troversy began in earnest in the mid-1960s with the publication of V. C.
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Wynne-Edwards' Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour (1962),
and G.C. Williams' response in his Adaptation and Natural Selection

(1966). As the title of Williams' book suggests, a focal point of the debate
concerned adaptations, in particular the question of whether adaptations
should be attributed to higher-level biological entities such as groups.

Wynne-Edwards argued that in fact such adaptations are quite common
in nature, for instance in the form of "epideictic displays" which serve

to inform individuals of the census size of their population so that they

can adjust their reproductive output accordingly, thus preventing the population from over-exploiting its resources and suffering a crash-and maybe
extinction. Wynne-Edwards proposed "group selection" as the mechanism explaining the maintenance of such group adaptations. Groups in

which individuals show reproductive restraint persist longer than, and may
invade areas left vacant by, groups in which individuals do not exercise
such restraint and as a consequence of resource depletion go extinct.
In an article published in Nature in 1963, Wynne-Edwards attempted

to clarify some of the issues presented in his book of the preceding year.
He emphasizes that group selection on his view accounts for group-level

adaptations evolved for group (rather than for individual) benefit.
The kinds of adaptations which make [overriding individual advan-

tage] possible . . . belong to and characterize social groups as entities, rather than their members individually. This in turn seems to
entail that natural selection has occurred between social groups as
evolutionary units in their own right, favouring the more efficient
variants among social systems wherever they have appeared, andfur-

thering their progressive development and adaptation. (Wynne-Edwards 1963, p. 623; emphasis added)
He is quite clear that group-level fitness is not reducible to the summation of individual fitness values.

Population fitness . . . depends on something over and above the
heritable basis that determines the success as individuals of a con-

tinuing stream of independent members. It becomes particularly clear
in relation to population homeostasis that social groups have highly
important adaptive characteristics in their own right. (Wynne-Edwards 1963, p. 624)

The emphasis throughout is on group adaptations resulting from heritable

differences between groups as social units.
Williams countered that most (or perhaps all) such supposed group adaptations could be explained in terms of individual organisms each behaving so as to maximize its own fitness. Fish do not swim in schools
because doing so is good for the school, even though it might, as a matter
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of fact, be good for the school, but because each fish is doing what is
good for itself. Schooling behavior is the product of individual adaptations. Thus there is no need to postulate group adaptations when the same

facts can be explained more parsimoniously in terms of individual adaptations (Williams 1966, pp. 212-217). Because group selection was
held to be the cause of group adaptations, Williams' arguments against
the latter were held to count equally against the former. Largely as a result
of his critique, group selection explanations fell into disrepute.

More recently, however, D. S. Wilson (1975, 1979, 1980, 1983) has
done much to revive the group selection debate by defending his "structured deme" model of "intrademic group selection". The model concerns
organisms whose interactions with each other during some part of their
life history take place within small local populations. Wilson calls such

local populations "trait-groups". Mosquito larvae occupying different pitcher
plants, bark beetles inhabiting different trees, and young birds being raised
in the same nest are examples he mentions (1980, p. 21). After a period

of interaction, the trait-groups dissolve, the individuals in each dispersing
into the global population to mate. Mating in the global population is

essentially random with respect to previous trait-group membership (that
is, panmixia obtains). The cycle can then begin again: the pitcher plant

mosquito, for example, will lay its eggs in another pitcher plant, and a
new local population of larvae will have been founded.
Wilson then asks us to consider how gene frequencies in the global

population might be affected by this cycle of within-trait-group interaction and dispersal into the global population. Changes in gene frequencies
within each trait-group are a product of individual selection operating

within each trait-group. Changes in gene frequencies in the post-dispersal
global population are a product of the relative contributions each traitgroup makes to the global population when it dissolves as well as con-

tinuing individual selection. Trait-group contributions to the post-dispersal global population need not be equal.

Consider a genotype whose activities increase the productivity of its
local population without, however, changing the gene frequency within

the population. Populations with a high frequency of this genotype

will be more productive than those with a low frequency, and will
differentially contribute to the pool of dispersers. The genetic compositions of the dispersers will be biased toward the genotype that
increases the productivity of its group, and this bias is carried into

all groups colonized by the dispersers. (Wilson 1980, p. 19)
In summary, by introducing the concept of structured demes (that is,

a global random-mating population broken up into local groups of interacting individuals), Wilson argues that natural selection becomes sensi-
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tive, not only to the fitness of individuals relative to each other in their
local populations, but also to the productivity of local populations relative
to each other in the global population. "This latter component may be

regarded as natural selection on the level of populations, or group selection" (Wilson 1980, pp. 19-20; emphasis in original).

Wilson's model describes a group process which is similar to the group
process envisioned by Wynne-Edwards in an important respect. In both
processes the subdivision of a global population into local groups con-

tributes to the increased representation of certain alleles in the global population. In both processes groups interact with their environments (which

may include other groups) in ways that cause their persistence and/or
multiplication to be differential. In both processes groups function as units

of selection. But the substantial differences between the two models of
"group selection" are worth noting as well.

An obvious difference is that whereas the mechanism for Wynne-Edwards' model is differential group extinction, the mechanism for Wilson's

model is differential trait-group productivity. Maynard Smith (1982, p.
30) suggests the terms "group-extinction selection" and "trait-group se-

lection" to mark this distinction. A more important difference, however,
is that whereas Wynne-Edwards' groups exhibit group adaptations, Wilson's trait-groups do not.

An adaptation is a property of a biological entity whose existence is
explained by reference to the selective advantage the property conferred

on the biological entity's ancestors. Adaptations are not just properties
conducive to fitness. They are phenotypic traits that have evolved as a

direct product of natural selection (Williams 1966; Lewontin 1978; Brandon 1981; Gould and Vrba 1982). In this sense, adaptations need not even

benefit the biological entities presently displaying them, if the environment the entity finds itself in is different from that in which the property
was selected for among its ancestors. For a biological entity to possess

a property as an adaptation, it must have inherited it from its progenitors,
but it need not increase the fitness of its present possessor.

Wynne-Edwards' groups display adaptations (for example, conservative resource utilization, reproductive restraint) in virtue of being the direct descendents of groups which benefitted from the possession of such
properties. Groups displaying such adaptations give rise to subsequent
groups displaying the same adaptations, while groups lacking such ad-

aptations go extinct. Wynne-Edwards' groups display heritable variation
in group fitness. In his own words, they are "evolutionary units", or what
are here being called units of evolution.

Wilson's trait-groups, on the other hand, because they are assembled
anew each generation from the global population, cannot be identified as
the descendents of specific trait-groups in the previous generation. A given
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trait-group might be composed of individuals descended from many (or
all) of the trait-groups in the previous generation. Trait-groups do not
inherit their group beneficial characteristics directly from other trait-groups.
They display characteristics affecting group productivity in virtue of properties that increased the fitness of the ancestors of their constituent organisms in previous generations. The adaptations associated with differential trait-group productivity, if there are such, are individual adaptations
rather than group adaptations. A concise way of stating this is that Wil-

son's trait-groups do not display heritable variation in group fitness. Unlike Wynne-Edwards' groups, they are not units of evolution.

Although he acknowledges important differences between his model

and Wynne-Edwards', Wilson says that, "it would be a pity to avoid
calling it group selection simply because that term has been applied to a

different conception of groups in the past" (Wilson 1979, p. 609). But
it is precisely because there are important differences between the two

conceptions of groups that it is crucial to distinguish between them. Pres-

ent in Wynne-Edwards' envisioned process of group selection, but lacking in Wilson's model, are group adaptations. An important historical

development has taken place in models of group selection. Distinguishing

between groups as units of selection and groups as units of evolution
helps to clarify the precise nature of this historically significant development.

6. Theoretical Applications. The distinction between units of selection
and units of evolution is not just of historical interest. It has some inter-

esting applications in contemporary biological theory as well. The abstract hypothetical example presented earlier (section 2) in which organ-

isms are selected on the basis of environmentally caused variance in fitness
is an example of phenotypic selection without a corresponding genetic
response. Organisms would not be expected to evolve adaptations through
such a process. They would be units of selection, but not units of evolution. Here I will add some concrete biological detail to the formal pos-

sibility sketched earlier.

Recall that Wynne-Edwards argued that groups which over-exploit their
resources are at a greater risk of extinction due to population crash than

are those groups which maintain census size somewhat below the carrying

capacity of the environment. The mechanism for population control proposed by Wynne-Edwards was reproductive restraint on the part of some
(or all) members of the group. Such restraint requires a strong degree of
altruism, since individuals must sacrifice some of their reproductive potential for the good of the group. The problem with this theory, as Williams and others since have shown, is in explaining how such altruistic
restraint is maintained against invasion of the group by "selfish" indi-
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viduals who reproduce to capacity at the expense of their neighbors.
As Wilson (1980) points out, however, the mechanism for population
regulation need not be voluntary restraint on the part of individual organisms. Population regulation can be achieved by some individuals interfering with the activities of their neighbors.
Perhaps the most general pathway for decreasing the cost of popu-

lation regulation is interference behavior. Whereas in exploitation,
organisms deal exclusively with their resources, in interference they

deal directly with competitors. (Wilson 1980, p. 64)
Interference behavior is characterized by two general features. First,

"All forms of interference derive their individual advantage from differ-

ential suppression of resource utilization" (Wilson 1980, p. 64). That is,
some individuals gain by excluding other individuals from partaking of
the resources. Eating a competitor is often an energy efficient means of
preventing that individual from utilizing scarce resources. Second, "Nonheritable differences between individuals feature prominently in nearly all

types of interference" (Wilson 1980, p. 64). The small, the young, and
the disabled of all genotypes, in particular, are more likely to be the
victims of interference. Size, age, and state of health are all variables

affecting vulnerability to being interfered with which are not necessarily
correlated with genotypic differences among individuals. Wilson illustrates these two features of interference using examples involving chem-

ical inhibition, cannibalism, dominance, and territoriality. Here I will only
discuss dominance, indicating how the relevant features of this behavior

apply also to other behaviors, especially to territoriality.
In any primate troop in which there are a surplus of males relative to

females, females will be a limiting resource with respect to which males
will compete for reproductive access. Observations confirm our expectations: not all males compete equally well. The concept of dominance
is used in behavioral ecology to describe a relationship between animals
in which one individual (the dominant one) is able to supplant another

(the subordinate one) from valuable resources. In primate troops there is
often one or more dominant males that effectively monopolizes females,
preventing subordinate males from mating. Such behavior satisfies the
first feature of interference identified by Wilson: individual advantage
results from differential suppression of resource utilization.

It appears that such behavior may, in some cases at least (and this is

all that is necessary for our purposes), satisfy the second feature of interference as well-nonheritable differences between individuals. Dis-

ruption of the dominance hierarchy in a troop of Hamadryas baboons (by
removing dominant males and then reintroducing them later) sometimes
leads to a re-ordering of individuals higher or lower on the hierarchy
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(Kummer 1971; Bachmann and Kummer 1980). Were differences in position in the hierarchy before disruption due to genetic differences between the individuals, one would expect, given that disruption doesn't

affect genetic makeup, that the individuals that were dominant before
would also be dominant after the disruption. Instead, dominance appears,
sometimes at least, to be a function of the history of the troop, taken
broadly to include past "ownership" of resources. If dominance with respect to control of females is correlated with fitness via increased reproductive opportunities, then there can ensue selection for being dominant,

even though dominance in such cases constitutes a nonheritable difference
between individuals.
It is easy to see how much the same conclusions might follow from an

examination of territoriality, defined broadly as any enforced spacing behavior. Those individuals possessing a territory enjoy a certain "resource
holding power" which excludes others from partaking of those same resources (Maynard Smith and Price 1973; Maynard Smith 1974; Parker

1974; Maynard Smith and Parker 1976). Initial acquisition of a territory
proceeds on a "first-come first-served" basis, perhaps in virtue of having
inherited the territory from parents. Competitions for territories are usu-

ally resolved merely on the basis of ownership, rather than on the basis
of other properties of the individuals (Davies 1978; Krebs and Davies

1981). Ownership may be heritable in one sense: individuals whose parents controlled a territory may be more likely to inherit a territory than
individuals with vagrant parents. But there is no reason to suppose that
there are relevant genetic differences between the winners and losers in

such cases. Selection may proceed entirely on the basis of genetically
nonheritable variation in fitness resulting from the differential utilization
of resources associated with the holding of a territory.
Consideration of interference behaviors such as dominance and terri-

toriality suggests that there is a class of selection processes in which (genetic) heritability is not essential. The organisms participating in selection
processes associated with these behaviors interact with the environment

and with each other in ways that cause their survival and/or reproduction
to be differential. They function as units of selection. But because such

organisms do not display heritable variation in fitness with respect to the

characteristics in question, they do not evolve adaptations with respect to
such phenotypic properties. They are not units of evolution. Here is a
theoretical context in which the distinction between units of selection and

units of evolution clarifies the way in which behavioral characteristics
may have great selective significance even though they have no effect on
gene frequencies.

But if behaviors of the kind described here do not have a direct impact
on gene frequencies, why should they be regarded as significant? They
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seem to have no evolutionary consequences, to be evolutionary dead-

ends. The problem with this objection is that it assumes that the only
significant selection processes in nature are those that result in evolu-

tionary change. There is a danger in identifying the reality of processes
occurring in nature with our ability to measure such processes. Without

a change in gene frequencies across generations, selection will be difficult
to detect. The ideal case for identifying the presence of a selection process
is when gene frequencies show a consistent trajectory for a substantial

period of time. Ideal though such cases may be, nature is not obliged to
make things convenient for investigators.The fact that phenotypic selec-

tion is much harder to identify in the absence of "trail markers" like
changes in gene frequencies or the evolution of adaptations is a function
of our perceptual acuity, not a fact about real processes occurring in nature.

Population geneticists may have little interest in phenotypic selection

apart from its direct consequences for evolution, but this is a function of
the current research agendas of (some) biologists, not an indication of
the importance of phenotypic selection in the causal structure of nature.
Ecologically, it seems of the first importance. Wilson summarizes his
discussion by saying, "In short, we have an event of great ecological
importance that is phenotypically highly selective between individuals,

yet is neutral from the genetic standpoint" (Wilson 1980, p. 72). If interference behavior of the kind described by Wilson represents pervasive
processes occurring in nature, then, from a theoretical standpoint, phenotypic selection must be regarded as an important biological process
worth studying.

7. Philosophical Applications. A final (brief) application of the distinction between units of selection and units of evolution concerns the

recent philosophical literature on the units of selection controversy. A
number of philosophers have proposed conceptual analyses of the term
"unit (or level) of selection". As we have seen, some, such as Wimsatt
(1980, 1981) and Lloyd (1986), require that units of selection be characterized as entities displaying heritable variation in fitness. Others, such

as Sober (1984) and Brandon (1982) do not require that units (or levels)

of selection be characterized in terms of heritability. Mayo and Gilinsky
(1987) are the most explicit writers on this latter view. "Heritability is
not strictly necessary for selection. . . For sustained evolutionary change

via selection, however, heritability is required" (Mayo and Gilinsky 1987,
p. 515). As my remarks throughout this paper make clear, I think that

the latter analyses make better sense, both historically and theoretically,
than the former.

A challenge to this view is found in remarks made by Griesemer and
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Wade (1988). They distinguish between (1) the causal process of evolution by natural selection, (2) the causal process of selection, and (3)
units of selection. They acknowledge that although heritability is not nec-

essary for selection, it is necessary for there to be an evolutionary response to selection. The possibility of there being an evolutionary response to selection seems to be the decisive consideration for them in
conceptualizing units of selection, for they go on to insist that a unit of

selection is to be characterized in terms of "the capacity to respond evolutionarily to selection, even if it never in fact does so" (p. 92). Ac-

cordingly, they endorse a refined "HVF [heritable variation in fitness]
criterion" due to Lloyd (1986) which they say gives necessary and sufficient conditions for an entity to be a unit of selection.
But if the causal processes of evolution by natural selection and selec-

tion are worth distinguishing, then surely the kinds of biological entities
that are capable of participating in these two processes are worth distinguishing as well. By including heritability in the requirements for a unit
of selection, one excludes from the start consideration of entities which
participate in phenotypic selection, but do not issue in any discernable
evolutionary response. Such entities and the processes they participate in
may be rare in nature or they may be common, but a conceptual analysis

should not prejudice the issue in such a way that certain empirical ques-

tions are precluded from being asked. By carefully distinguishing between processes that require heritability and those that do not, we are in
a better position to isolate the necessary and sufficient conditions an entity
must display in order to function in each of these processes, and thereby

to determine the empirical importance of each in the causal structure of
nature. The distinction between units of selection and units of evolution

clarifies the question of which properties an entity must possess in order
to participate in different biological processes, and thus facilitates the
empirical investigation of biological phenomena.

8. Summary/Conclusion. Empirical identification of units of selection
in evolutionary biology has suffered from confusion concerning the necessary properties of a unit of selection. Starting from a distinction made

explicit by Maynard Smith, I have argued that in identifying units of
selection we are concerned with entities which, in virtue of biological
properties they display, interact with the environment in a way that causes

their survival and/or reproduction to be differential. That is, we are concerned with the entities participating in the subprocess of phenotypic selection. For such a process, entities need not exhibit heritable variation
in fitness. When we inquire about the entities which display adaptations,

we are asking which biological entities exhibit the properties they do because their ancestors participated in selection processes favoring those
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properties. The acquisition of adaptations requires a genetic response on

the part of the entities in question. Entities displaying heritable variation
in fitness are units of evolution.

The distinction between units of selection and units of evolution clarifies historical, theoretical, and philosophical aspects of the units of selection controversy. Whereas Wynne-Edwards and Williams were con-

cerned with biological entities that evolve adaptations, recent debates,

such as that concerning Wilson's trait-group model, concern the entities
that function in group-mediated selection processes not issuing in group
adaptations. The thesis that there may be significant selection processes
in nature which do not have an impact on gene frequencies finds support
in the analysis of interference behavior. Finally, by distinguishing be-

tween the concepts of units of selection and units of evolution, the empirical investigation of evolutionarily neutral but ecologically significant
processes is encouraged.
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